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 - original and great insightThis is the book I drag around everywhere, you can only read a few pages at a time because you need to think while digesting. the author is very knowledgable - sometimes too knowledgable, but that's a good thing, because he has a lot to say, a different point of view, a chip on his shoulder, intelligence to burn, a worldview bought to american shores, and he is conflicted about the class system - shrugging his shoulders at the suits, but flinging out big names here and there. No matter, it is worth the price of the book, because he stimulates thought. A sure sign of a good teacher, as well as tossing out more than a few investment strategies and his well-concieved notions about our financial system. Love Taleb and hate him. I look forward to whatever he is working on now, and will go back & buy the Random book that everyone keeps referring to. Rating:  - The emperor has no clothesThe Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable A highly disappointing text from an erudite and capable author. The book is fallacious, mislaeding and mischievious. The abuse of simple statistical distributions alone warrants not taking it seriously. It is oversold by the blurb and does not do what it says on the cover. Extremely disappointing. Rating:  - more unbearable than before, and now deluded Taleb was unbearable in "Fooled by Randomness." Fooled was, however, worth the read. "Swan" is targeted to a general audience; in this attempt Taleb has lost his potentcy. But to greater effect, Taleb now seems deluded. For example, he tells a story of his past when as a tween he frightens the government of his home nation into granting him immunity from political offenses. Sad naive existence Rating: - Good read, but fooled by randomness is betterBlack swans are rare, unpredicatable events that pack a big punch. As Teleb explains, they are not accounted for by modern financial theories. Black Swans are particularly relevant to today's market calamity...and they will likely arise many times in the remainder of our lifetimes...to our benefit...if we are prepared. The lesson is to prepare for these events...and to exploit them. Rating:  - A must-read for a quant, but...... but Dr. Taleb goes too far by claiming that the quantitative analysts, including statisticians, are (or even were) mesmerized by the Gaussian curve or any other quantitative concept, for that matter. Even the undergrads here at Purdue are taught to understand that the mean and standard deviation are not always descriptive of the distribution and that a single outlier can have a great impact on the fit of simple linear regression. As for PhD-level people, there are enough of us able to handle data with care and who are well aware that Pareto & Barabasi is not a cool label of Italian fashion. By the way, how come that Extreme Value Theory (at least 60 years old) is never mentioned in the book dedicated to the extreme? I don't believe that such people as Markowitz, Scholes, or Samuelson thought even for a second that their job was to create models that would alleviate the hardship of the long-suffering investment banking community. That was never a requirement for academic promotion or the Nobel Prize, which was their ultimate goal, whether they admit it or not. Therefore, any "quant" who took those models at face value deserved all he got. Most importantly, I believe such misguided model-worshippers have always been few in the industry, especially after 1998. MBA graduates, too, have enough sense to know what is what even after being through a Modern Portfolio Theory course. Courses like that, according to Dr. Taleb, have to be wiped out along with the academic disciples of Markowitz and Samuelson. But will that "ethnical cleansing" do any good? Perhaps the sad truth is that in the industry both MBAs and PhDs quickly realized that claiming they can quantify any financial product generates a fat stream of immediate bonuses, although at the expense of possible (but surely very distant :) blowup. If that is the case, all those people consciously use bogus models as a front. Hence, contrary to what Dr. Taleb thinks, Nobel Prize winners and their followers in the academia are hardly to blame. So, why don't we leave the distinguished professors alone and turn to those who set the malign short-term incentives in financial institutions.
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